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Abstract
Russia has been following an Arctic policy that is highly heterogeneous, combining efforts at pre-
serving cooperation with Western neighbors with commitment to building up its own strength. 
Three distinct policy modes can be identified: realist/militaristic, institutional/cooperative, and 
diplomatic management. Each mode is based on a particular interpretation of Russia’s various 
interests in the High North/Arctic: nuclear/strategic, geopolitical, economic/energy-related, and 
symbolic. Examination of policy modes and interests shows that each combination contains some 
elements that focus on preserving the status quo in the Arctic, while other elements push for 
changes in Russia’s favor. This article finds that revisionist elements have been gaining in strength, 
but that current policy still attaches high value to sustaining traditional patterns, even if they 
demand more resources and provide fewer advantages and revenues. 
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1. Introduction
The Arctic constitutes a unique—and uniquely controversial—political and geo-
graphic component in Russia’s foreign policy. The essence of the controversy lies 
in the combination of two dubiously compatible guidelines: the commitment to 
developing international cooperation, and the heavy investment in militarization of 
the Russian High North. Artur Chilingarov’s flag-planting expedition to the North 
Pole in summer 2007 spurred disproportionally heavy global reactions alerting the 
Russian leadership to the growing attention in the West to the Arctic region. That 
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awareness translated into perceptions of escalating geopolitical competition, in turn 
motivating the Kremlin to strengthen Russia’s military reach in the High North in 
order to secure its own interests. This reliance on military instruments of policy 
has been further strengthened with the emergence of a new confrontation between 
 Russia and the West, caused by the explosion of the Ukraine crisis in spring 2014.1 
That being said, declarations of readiness to sustain international cooperation are not 
mere camouflage for military activities: they reflect a real preference in the Russian 
leadership for cultivating institutional and political ties with the Arctic neighbors.
This dualism was clearly illustrated in President Vladimir Putin’s March 2018 
address to the Federal Assembly, a speech which consisted of two logically and sty-
listically unconnected parts: economic acceleration, and missile deployment. The 
Arctic was peripheral to Putin’s economic narrative, mentioned only in a brief pas-
sage concerning the development of infrastructure and maritime transport.2 In the 
second part of the address, the Arctic was not mentioned directly, except to note that 
a new nuclear-propelled cruise missile had been tested in late 2017 at the Central 
Test Site on the Novaya Zemlya archipelago.3 One striking aspect of this address 
was that the two parts worked at cross-purposes: an acceleration of the arms race 
is detrimental to economic development—but cannot take place without it. That is 
exactly the problem with the two avenues of Russia’s Arctic policy. Their divergence 
was recognized in Moscow already at the start of the current decade, and political 
work on establishing a middle ground has continued ever since.
Efforts at bridging the gap between cooperative initiatives and militarization pro-
grams should not be dismissed as merely bureaucratic maneuvering. It could be ana-
lytically productive to distinguish three patterns (or policy modes) in the Kremlin’s 
Arctic policy.4 The first one is based on the premise that military power is the main 
means of advancing Russia’s interests in the Arctic, and can be defined as “real-
ist/militaristic.” The second policy mode aims at developing Russia’s ties with its 
 Arctic neighbors, and is aptly described as “cooperative/institutional.” The third pol-
icy mode is the most fluid, combining building power capabilities with attempts at 
preserving cooperative ties, which amount to making the Arctic an exception in the 
evolving confrontation between Russia and the West; this can be described as “dip-
lomatic management mode.” All three policy modes are evolving in a rapidly shifting 
international environment, with Russia sometimes seeking to preserve its positions 
and sometimes to advance them, demonstrating behavior typical of status-quo and 
revisionist powers simultaneously. This intersection of policy modes and dynamic 
shifts can be presented as a matrix, as indicated in Table 1.
Table 1. Policy modes and political behavior
Status-quo Revisionist
Realist/militaristic
Institutional/cooperative
Diplomatic management
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This article aims at filling the blanks in the matrix by assessing the prevalence of 
status-quo and revisionist behavior within the three policy modes mentioned above. 
These types of behavior are generally self-explanatory: a status-quo policy aims at 
preserving and sustaining the existing order of international interactions, whereas 
a revisionist policy aims at a significant advancement of Russia’s positions in the 
 Arctic vis-à-vis its neighbors. The analysis starts by identifying four key interest areas 
driving Russia’s policy in the Arctic, and then examines the mix of status-quo and 
revisionist drivers in each of these policy areas. The result is a complex matrix of 
24 parameters, in turn inviting some conclusions.
2. Russia’s divergent interests in the Arctic
Russia has significant and far-reaching interests in the vast Arctic region, but their 
content is open to many interpretations, and even the entirely material aspects may 
be variously understood. Moreover, these interests are also divergent: some of them 
underpin efforts aimed at building cooperation; others sustain the course of con-
frontation, whereas the policy mode referred to here as “diplomatic management” 
may draw on elements of most interests.5 The interests, which can be grouped into 
nuclear/strategic, geopolitical, economic/energy-related, and symbolic, interact 
in many disharmonious combinations. Of key significance for the analysis here is 
that, within each category of interests, there are certain elements that promote the 
 status-quo policy, and counter-elements that encourage revisionist tendencies. This 
article explores how shifts in the content of these interests act to tilt the balance 
between status-quo and revisionist policies.
Russia’s nuclear/strategic interests are shaped by the fact that the Kola Peninsula 
is the main base for the country’s strategic submarines (SSBNs)—which, provided 
that the New Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty (START), signed in 2010, is formally 
extended or at least observed, will carry the main share of nuclear warheads on their 
Sineva (SS-N-23) and Bulava (SS-N-32) intercontinental missiles in the 2020s.6 
Another parameter of these interests is determined by the geo-strategic fact that the 
shortest trajectory for a hypothetical missile exchange between Russia and the USA 
goes across the North Pole, making the High North crucially important for deploy-
ing the early warning and missile defense systems of both sides. It has been argued 
that these major components of Russia’s deterrence structure are merely located in 
the Arctic, not necessarily aimed at operations in that region.7 However, these assets 
need solid protection against potential “disarming” strikes—which in turn involves 
developing a grouping of conventional forces that is, to all intents and purposes, 
designed for operations in the Arctic region.
The geopolitical interests center on Russia’s competitive interactions with states 
that seek to expand their stake in the Arctic by undermining the primacy of sover-
eignty as the main principle of governing the region.8 Deeply opposed to the idea of 
turning the Arctic into a “global commons,” Moscow acknowledges the imperative 
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of strengthening the shared position of the five littoral powers in order to limit the 
influence of various “outsiders.” On the other hand, there is no way around the fact 
that Russia’s four Arctic neighbors are NATO member-states and, in a situation of a 
developing confrontation, would be intrinsically hostile to the Kremlin’s positions.9 
Although Moscow presents itself as an upholder of international law, it remains 
a firm believer in the ultimate importance of military force in interstate relations. 
Its commitment to strengthening international institutions governing the Arctic is 
therefore counter-balanced with the determination to rely on own power in protect-
ing its rich possessions.
The economic/energy-related interests are linked primarily to the oil and natural gas 
reserves in the wetlands of Western Siberia and offshore. Although the former have 
been investigated rather thoroughly (but there is still much exploration to be done 
in Eastern Siberia), the latter are essentially an unknown. This leaves room for all 
sorts of wild exaggerations, for which the only—and far from solid—reference point 
is the 2008 appraisal of the US Geological Survey.10 These data have been grossly 
misinterpreted, and conclusions about an inevitable fierce struggle of Western oil 
majors for this “treasure trove” are taken for granted, particularly since the 2016 
Russian Foreign Policy Concept identified this struggle as a key driver of escala-
tion of global tensions.11 The desire to assert control over these assumed natural 
riches clashes with the reluctant recognition that the offshore resources can only be 
 developed in cooperation with Western companies, which possess the technology 
and know-how.
The symbolic interests are strongly pronounced, but hard to define precisely. The 
Arctic occupies a very special place in the collective psyche of many Russians, and 
the political leadership has mastered propaganda methods for stimulating and tar-
geting these vague feelings.12 In order to mobilize public support for various and 
often costly enterprises in the High North, notions of “conquering” (pokorenie) and 
“owning” (vladenie) are systematically emphasized in the mainstream discourse on 
Arctic matters. One key manifestation of Russia’s “ownership” over the Arctic seas 
is the sustained effort at upgrading the Northern Sea Route (Sevmorput): Putin’s 
March 2018 address to the Federal Assembly highlighted the spectacular prospects 
of expanding this maritime corridor once again.13 Also playing on nationalistic per-
ceptions is the propaganda spin put on Russia’s claim for extending the continental 
shelf beyond 200 nautical miles, re-submitted to the UN Commission on the Limits 
of the Continental Shelf (UN CLCS) in August 2015.14
Russia’s interests in the Arctic are far from coherent or even complementary, and 
the lobby groups that pursue them—from the Northern Fleet command to oil com-
panies and the Russian Geographical Society—are often at odds with one another, 
making the Kremlin the ultimate arbiter. The sum total of these interests and the 
cumulative influence of the lobbying is strong enough to make the region a priority 
in Russia’s foreign and security policy—and to keep President Putin interested in 
the Arctic agenda.
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3. Strategic balance and nuclear revisionism
Maintaining the strategic balance with the USA is a fundamental imperative in 
Russian security thinking, which views numerical equality as a crucial condition 
for global stability and a foundation of the existing world order. Maintaining the 
capacity to inflict devastating damage in a retaliatory strike (as envisaged by the 
“Mutual Assured Destruction” doctrine) is a necessary but not sufficient element 
of this posture. Russia insists on maintaining equality in the number of warheads 
and delivery vehicles, and the USA has accepted the inviolability of that equation, 
originally established in the arms control process with the Soviet Union back in the 
late 1960s and reinforced by the 2010 New START. Despite all the acrimony of the 
new confrontation, both sides have so far adhered meticulously to the provisions of 
the Treaty. They reported achieving the prescribed limits at the start of 2018, and 
may yet agree to extend it beyond 2021, when the current ten-year period expires.15 
Preservation of this balance is the central premise of the status-quo nuclear policy. 
However, US President Trump’s decision to withdraw from the INF Treaty,16 as 
well as new technological developments (particularly in missile defense), challenge 
this stability. In the longer run, Moscow may come to see its status-quo policy as 
unsustainable.
Russia’s nuclear modernization programs executed in the Arctic tend to fit the 
pattern of preserving the strategic balance. The single most expensive item in 
the recently approved 2027 State Armament Program (as in the previous 2020 State 
Armament Program) is the deployment of a new generation of strategic submarines 
(Borei-class, or Project 955). Three of these submarines are already operational, five 
are in various stages of construction, and six more are planned.17 This investment 
is necessary in order to ensure that the naval leg of the strategic triad remains firm: 
the Delta-III (Kalmar-class) submarines will be decommissioned and the Delta-IV 
( Dolphin-class) submarines can, with necessary overhauls, be retained in combat 
order through the next decade, but no longer.18 The main problem with this plan 
is that the Bulava missile, which is the main weapon system for the Borei-class sub-
marines, has a checkered record. It was test-fired only once in 2016 and once in 
2017, and the successful four-missile salvo launched in May 2018 did not erase all 
concerns.19 Any new setback would deliver a heavy blow to the reliability of Russia’s 
deterrence—quite possibly prompting President Putin in his 2018 address to elabo-
rate on the entirely fanciful idea of extra-long-range nuclear-propelled underwater 
drones (more pretentiously re-branded as Poseidon, from the stodgy Status-6), rather 
than admit that Russia had made deep cuts in its shipbuilding program.20
The modernization of the early warning system, including the construction of a 
new Voronezh-DM radar in Olenegorsk (Murmansk region), also fits in with the 
status-quo policy, particularly since Russia has encountered massive problems in 
deploying a reliable grouping of intelligence satellites.21 What the Russian High Com-
mand sees as the main threat to the stability of the strategic balance is the continually 
modified US plan for developing a missile defense system. However, that same logic 
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is not applied to Russia’s own work on modernizing its missile defense capabilities, 
a process which Russian sources have described as highly advanced.22 Putin’s April 
2018 presentation of “wonder-missiles” was intended to prove the utter futility of the 
US plan—but, besides such declarations, Russia has also been preparing for poten-
tial direct action against US missile defense assets, for instance through a simulated 
air strike on the Globus 3 radar in Vardø, Norway.23 Such counter- measures against 
an over-estimated threat go beyond the parameters of a purely status-quo-oriented 
policy and become elements of revisionism.
The main driver of a revisionist course, however, comes from the increasingly 
acute need to achieve political dividends from Russia’s huge investments in nuclear 
modernization. In a situation of evolving and deeply asymmetric confrontation, the 
Kremlin cannot afford to let these expensive strategic assets remain idle, and must 
find a way to bring its most powerful instrument into political play. Putin’s unex-
pected video-show about the super-missiles was one step in this direction—although 
far from successful, according to many Russian experts.24 To let the New START 
expire would constitute a strongly revisionist move. The consequences of such a move 
could be further amplified by the imminent destruction of the INF Treaty as well as a 
future transfer of non-strategic (tactical) nuclear weapons from permanent storages 
to the combat units, including the ships and submarines of the Northern Fleet.25 
The most radical step would be to resume nuclear testing on the Novaya Zemlya 
test site.26 Such an act would not involve a major breach of international obligations, 
as Moscow could argue that the Comprehensive Nuclear Test Ban Treaty (CTBT, 
adopted 1996) never entered into force, as the USA (and China) failed to ratify it.
On the whole, with the massive and sustained modernization of its nuclear arse-
nal, Russia has made a shift from a status-quo policy of maintaining strategic balance 
with the USA to a revisionist policy of active political use of nuclear instruments 
entirely feasible.
4. Geopolitical interplay and underwater revisionism
Geopolitical perceptions and propositions are remarkably influential in Russian 
political thinking. They tend to be fairly crude and unsophisticated, asserting the 
inevitability of competition and clashes between various state powers in the emerging 
“multipolar world.”27 In the Arctic region, this competition is perceived as driven by 
the “rush for resources”—something that is hard to identify in real interstate interac-
tions, but is nevertheless presumed to exist and expected to acquire a more forceful 
character. The new confrontation with the West caused by the Russian aggression 
against Ukraine has reinforced these geopolitical propositions. What matters most in 
the Kremlin’s current geopolitical perspective is that all of Russia’s four neighbors 
sharing the Arctic littoral happen to be NATO member-states: that determines the 
central role of military instruments in securing Russia’s positions in the fast-evolving 
confrontation.
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Strategic nuclear forces, primarily the submarines, are of little relevance for this 
regional competition, but the conventional forces that are intended to provide pro-
tection for the strategic assets may double up as capabilities for projecting power in 
the Arctic theater. The severe deterioration of the Northern Fleet during the first two 
post-Soviet decades has rendered it incapable of performing the traditional mission 
of establishing a “naval bastion” in the Barents Sea.28 What is now defined as the key 
mission is gaining effective air dominance in that area. Russian military strategy does 
not have a systematic proposition resembling the “Anti-Access/Area Denial” (A2/
AD) concept, but the deployment of new long-range air defense systems in combina-
tion with anti-ship missiles serves essentially the same purpose.29 Today, the 1st Air 
Defense Division, located on the Kola Peninsula, deploys the state-of-the-art S-400 
Triumph surface-to-air missiles (modified for the conditions of extreme cold), while 
one regiment with S-300 missiles is now based on Novaya Zemlya.30 An extension of 
this protective “bubble” over the Western part of the Barents Sea effectively grants 
Russia a position of military superiority far above and beyond what could possibly 
be needed for defending its positions against any hostile challenges.
Despite the shortage of resources, cuts in the shipbuilding program, and the 
demands from other theaters more exposed to direct threats, Moscow has been 
investing considerable efforts in upgrading this dominant position even further. The 
Arctic Command (created in 2015 on the basis of the Northern Fleet HQ) inte-
grates units of all branches of the Armed Forces in joint operational planning—a 
major improvement in command structure. The main emphasis in exercising combat 
readiness is placed on amphibious operations supported by missile strikes from naval 
platforms. Several such exercises were closely coordinated with the strategic Zapad-
2017 exercise in September 2017.31 These military preparations alarm Russia’s 
Nordic neighbors, which have been increasing their defense budgets and expanding 
cooperation, as demonstrated by the Arctic Challenge 2017 and the Trident Juncture 
2018 exercises in Norway.32 Russia, in turn, has consistently sought to counter every 
such exercise with its own, on a larger scale. It has also issued sharp warnings to 
Norway against inviting more US Marines and letting them train on a rotation basis 
in the Inner Troms region in the Arctic, rather than in central Norway, where they 
have been training since 2017.33
The prospect that worries Moscow the most is that its military activities in the 
High North may be compelling Finland and Sweden to add more content to their 
partnership with NATO, so that the issue of fully joining the alliance gains traction 
in public debates. Moscow has repeatedly applied political pressure on Finland in 
order to emphasize that such accession is absolutely unacceptable for Russia, but 
Helsinki has not been responding to this heavy-handed diplomacy with its tradi-
tional deference.34 In Sweden, growing concerns about Russian interference and 
threats, particularly toward the island of Gotland in the Baltic Sea, have led to a 
shift in public opinion in favor of joining NATO.35 In principle, Russian efforts at 
blocking such a development fits into the pattern of a status-quo policy, as such 
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an expansion of the Atlantic alliance—as seen from Moscow—would amount to a 
major shift in the military balance in the Arctic theater.36 However, the methods that 
Russia employs in pursuing this policy have been so crude and aggressive that the 
Nordic counter-measures, including recent establishment in Helsinki of a European 
Center of Excellence for Countering Hybrid Threats,37 seem well-justified.
Where Russia’s policy distances itself even further from status-quo preservation is 
the much-politicized issue of expanding “ownership” of the continental shelf—which 
makes no difference for navigation or for fisheries, but is nevertheless presented as a 
matter of major importance. Russia was the first Arctic state to file a claim with the 
UN Commission on the Limits of the Continental Shelf (UN CLCS) in accordance 
with the Law of the Sea Convention (UNCLOS): in 2001, it presented a claim for 
some 1.2 million square kilometers between the Lomonosov and Mendeleev under-
water ridges, territory stretching all the way up to the North Pole—only to see the 
claim returned for further substantiation. It took 13 years to collect scientific data 
to back Russia’s claim concerning where to draw the outer limits of the continental 
shelf, and in August 2015 the claim was re-submitted. In Moscow, considerable 
anxiety now attends the CLCS deliberations on a verdict.38 In fact, the only recom-
mendation the Commission can issue is to sort out the conflict between the Russian 
and the Danish claims, as well as with a Canadian claim, which might be submitted 
by the end of 2018.39 This uncertainty does not sit well with Russia’s inordinate 
assertiveness. Although Moscow is currently well served by the UNCLOS, it might 
in the future resort to unilateral steps. In seeking to justify such a departure from 
international law, Russia might argue that the CLCS has been deliberately procras-
tinating, or by referring to the US failure to ratify the UNCLOS.
Overall, Russia has been preparing for a spike in geopolitical confrontation in the 
Arctic. Its position of military dominance in the Barents region constitutes a threat 
to the Nordic neighbors, who feel compelled to step up their own defense prepa-
rations. These dynamics, resembling the classical security dilemma model, might 
prompt Moscow to shift from the status-quo policy of maintaining its position of 
strength, to a revisionist policy of actually using that strength. 
5. Economic disappointments and Chinese revisionism
The regions of the High North have far greater economic significance for Russia than 
for any other Arctic states. Indeed, the world’s two major urban centers within the 
Arctic Circle, Murmansk and Norilsk (with some 300,000 and 180,000 residents, 
respectively), are both located in Russia. However, much of this development is the 
heritage of the massive Soviet thrust at “conquering” the Arctic, which was planned 
and executed without proper economic rationale.40 In the modern Russian econ-
omy, which is stagnating as not-quite-market and not-entirely-state-controlled, the 
real economic interests are difficult to ascertain. What is clear, however, is that—
despite Putin’s declaration that the Russians have not just returned to the Arctic but 
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have “settled there anew and firmly”—the depopulation of Russia’s High North has 
continued.41
The modern economy of the Russian Arctic is shaped primarily by extraction 
industries, with the development of hydrocarbon resources widely seen as the main 
mid-term economic driver. In 2010, when visiting a research station in Yakutia, Putin 
stated: “the reserves discovered to date are worth approximately $5 trillion, includ-
ing oil, natural gas, coal, gold and diamonds.”42 One major recent development is the 
start-up of producing natural gas from the huge resources on the Yamal Peninsula. 
However, the fields in Western Siberia, exploited since the mid-1970, are now in 
rapid decline. The next big shift would be to go offshore, where reserves are poorly 
explored but are expected to be tremendously rich. 
The first offshore project developed by Gazprom in the Pechora Sea (to the south 
of Novaya Zemlya) started production from the stationary Prirazlomnaya platform 
in late 2013, but the delays and cost overruns with this relatively simple project 
showed that the envisaged offshore shift would be hard to achieve.43 This experience 
reinforced the lessons from the collapse of the Shtokman project. The development 
of that huge and well-explored gas-field in the ice-free Barents Sea had been per-
sonally supervised by Putin; but in 2012, because of the withdrawal of Statoil from 
the joint venture set up to develop Shtokman as well as the negative cost-efficiency 
estimates, the project was shelved.44 The shifts underway in the global gas market 
since then have made it impossible to re-launch the project. 
Moscow has nevertheless persisted with offshore exploration. In September 
2014, Rosneft announced, with tremendous fanfare, that its joint venture with 
 ExxonMobil had discovered a significant oilfield in the Kara Sea.45 However, fur-
ther exploration was curtailed due to the enforcement of Western sanctions specifi-
cally targeting Russia’s energy sector and its Arctic projects, and in February 2018, 
 ExxonMobil announced its withdrawal from all joint ventures in Russia.46 Moscow 
cannot hope for a meaningful relaxation of the sanctions regime in the near future. 
In fact, however, the main problem with plans for tapping into the presumably abun-
dant resources of the Arctic shelf is that, at current price levels, the costs of off-shore 
projects are prohibitive.47
In this situation, a status-quo policy becomes impossible because it is based on 
the premise of pragmatic cooperation with the Western energy majors. In princi-
ple, such cooperation could be exempted from the general pattern of confronta-
tion, as is Russia’s gas export to Europe. In the latter case, a controversial project 
like the Nord Stream 2, set to increase Russian gas supplies to Europe through a 
new pipeline across the Baltic Sea, has been making progress despite the sanctions 
regime. In the Arctic, however, such ties have been effectively broken, and  Moscow 
must explore alternatives. The most promising of these is increased cooperation 
with China, which Russia has previously been reluctant to pursue, even objecting 
to granting China observer status in the Arctic Council. The arguments for keeping 
China away from the Arctic were dropped in April 2016, when Beijing came to the 
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rescue of the troubled Yamal-LNG project, which had been developed by the pri-
vately-owned Novatek.48 The motivations for this very timely generosity had little 
to do with  Chinese demand for LNG, and much to do with making Gennadii Tim-
chenko, an oligarch of Putin’s inner circle, indebted to China—and getting Putin 
himself more positively disposed to China’s advances.49 The main volumes of gas 
from Yamal continue to go to Europe by pipeline.
In January 2018, China presented its Arctic ambitions in a White Paper.50 Beijing 
opted to go public with this declaration of interests, confident that Moscow would 
not raise objections.51 This Russian position could be described as revisionism by 
default: it signifies consent to China’s creeping revisionism, which in turn might pro-
foundly shift the traditional balance of interests between the Arctic states and distort 
the pattern of their cooperation. Russia’s own ability to alter the economic status 
quo, with its high costs and diminishing returns, is set to remain limited.
6. Revival of the Northern Sea Route and symbolic revisionism
Russia’s Arctic policy is heavily laden with symbolism. In order to sustain public 
support for the heavy-maintenance and low-profit initiatives, it is crucial to connect 
them with the abstract but strong perceptions of “ownership” of the vast inhospitable 
spaces of the High North. These perceptions are often mutually incompatible and 
in conflict with reality—for instance, the vision of pristine frozen lands and seas that 
co-exists with the greed for harvesting the anticipated enormous riches of natural 
resources. They also clash with the fact of devastating pollution around the Norilsk 
industrial cluster in Western Siberia and the Nikel plant on the Kola Peninsula.52 
In this complex multi-component blend, there is a distinct and vociferous trend of 
asserting and demonstrating to hostile “others” (the four other littoral states in par-
ticular) that the Arctic, including the symbolically important North Pole, belongs to 
Russia. That amounts to a pronounced revisionism of the course toward strengthen-
ing the institutions of international governance of this “global commons.”
Putin is highly attentive to this “patriotic” discourse; he also seems to have devel-
oped a personal attachment to the unique Arctic frontier. While he is committed to 
executing projects aimed at removing the accumulated wastes around the old Soviet 
settlements, his state-centric approach to environmentalism is aimed at  limiting the 
activities of environmentalist NGOs: Greenpeace is treated as an outright secu-
rity challenge.53 However, his main commitment is to the revival of the Northern 
Sea Route (Sevmorput)—and in this policy we see more of a desire to recycle the 
 Soviet-era pseudo-romantic appeal of “conquering” the Arctic than sober economic 
rationale and cost-efficiency calculations.
The idea of turning the Northern Sea Route into a major international maritime 
transit avenue was much advocated at the start of this decade, but failed to gain prac-
tical traction. Over the last few navigation seasons, international shipping compa-
nies have attempted some experimental voyages, but their conclusions have stressed 
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the unpredictable conditions, high costs, and under-developed infrastructure. While 
destination shipping has been stimulated by the Yamal-LNG project, with the new 
Sabetta terminal now set to become a major and privileged operator in the gradually 
thawing but still very challenging Northern Sea Route, the recent forceful eradica-
tion of the piracy threat in the Indian Ocean and the opening of the second lane of 
the Suez Canal have diminished the attractiveness of the challenging Arctic Ocean 
route.54 
At the same time, Russia has introduced changes into its policy on commercial 
shipping in the northern seas, becoming less friendly to international partners and 
more restrictive. For instance, new legal provisions adopted in late 2017 prescribe 
that shipments of oil and natural gas may be conducted only on tankers registered 
in Russia.55 Moreover, administrative control of the development of the Northern 
Sea Route and the supporting infrastructure have been transferred to Rosatom, the 
state-owned corporation that operates Russia’s nuclear icebreaker fleet.56 
This nuclearization goes hand in hand with militarization of the eastern part of 
Russia’s Arctic littoral, which now features several newly-built military bases. The 
Northern Fleet, which had never performed tasks to the east of the Barents Sea and 
still does not have in its combat order a single ice-class surface vessel, has in recent 
years sailed toward the restored Temp naval base on Kotelny Island (located between 
the Laptev Sea and the East Siberian Sea) and even to Chukotka in the Vostok-2018 
exercises, and has finally received its first diesel icebreaker, Ilya Muromets.57 
This combination of militarization and nuclearization amounts to a shift in 
 Russia’s strategy for the eastern part of its Arctic expanses that is more in tune with 
“symbolic revisionism.”58 The sustainability of this expensive prioritization of geo-
political ambitions is very uncertain. The Defense Ministry has announced that the 
construction of Arctic bases has been completed, with no further investments ear-
marked for the expansion of this chain of footholds.59 Russian securitization of the 
Northern Sea Route does not sit well with China, which prefers to emphasize the 
commercial character of its Arctic aspirations and seeks to free its own explorations 
from the restraints of Russian control.60 This revisionism is costly and serves no use-
ful purpose, apart from catering to illusory desires.
7. Conclusions
Russia’s policy in the Arctic remains incoherent, uncoordinated, and mismanaged. 
As shown in Tables 2 and 3, it features conflicting elements of preserving the status 
quo as well as revisionism. Elements of the latter type have been gaining in strength; 
and, although the direct security risks involved in setting a revisionist course in the 
High North may be lower than in most other regions of Russia’s neighborhood, the 
costs of a forceful advancement of Russian interests at the expense of the  Arctic 
neighbors would be so high that, in a rational decision-making environment, they 
would be recognized as untenable. Moreover, as Moscow becomes increasingly 
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disappointed with cooperative/institutional approaches, its realist inclinations may 
become more pronounced, particularly as regards reliance on military power. The 
third policy mode, which we have termed diplomatic management, remains relevant, 
but is executed in combination with unilateral actions aimed at advancing Russia’s 
interests at the expense of those of its neighbors. 
Today Moscow gives greater priority to the Arctic than the actual scope of material 
and ideational interests or the level of threat would justify. Reinforcing this priority 
would inevitably mean fewer resources available for protecting Russian interests in 
other regions, where instability and the risk of violent conflicts are higher. However, 
the Kremlin’s cost/benefit calculations are fluid, shifting with fluctuations in the evolv-
ing conflict with the West—something which makes the developing pattern of con-
frontation significantly different from the rigid confrontation of the Cold War era.61
Table 2. Features of Russian status-quo policy
Nuclear/strategic Geopolitical Economic/
energy-related
Symbolic
Realist Steady 
modernization of 
nuclear capabilities 
Cutting down 
on shipbuilding 
program
Developing 
onshore projects 
Investing in the 
infrastructure of the 
Northern Sea Route 
Institutional Extending New 
START 
Ensuring 
transparency of 
military exercises 
Resuming 
cooperation with 
Western partners
Strengthening 
of international 
governance 
Diplomatic 
management
Abiding by the  
INF ban
Blocking NATO 
enlargement 
Working on 
relaxation of 
sanctions 
Building cooperation 
between the Arctic 
Five 
Table 3. Features of Russian revisionist policy
Nuclear/strategic Geopolitical Economic/ 
energy-related
Symbolic
Realist Resuming nuclear 
testing 
Strengthening 
military superiority
Developing offshore 
projects 
Further militarization 
of the Eastern littoral
Institutional Abandoning the 
New START 
Increasing scale 
and frequency of 
non-transparent 
exercises
Expanding 
cooperation with 
Chinese partners 
Enforcing stricter 
control over the 
Northern Sea Route
Diplomatic 
management
Deploying missiles 
banned under the 
INF 
Securing control 
over expanded 
continental shelf 
Reorienting toward 
Chinese LNG 
market 
Nuclearization 
through Rosatom 
management
Engaging in the new confrontation, Moscow has been experimenting with a range 
of “hybrid” means and instruments, but their applicability in the Arctic is in fact 
quite limited. Western corporate actors have been treading very carefully, while the 
 Russian special services are unable to connect with two actors increasingly important 
Pavel K. Baev
420
in Arctic affairs: environmentalist NGOs and organizations representing indigenous 
peoples. Most of the work on clearing the Russian Arctic of industrial wastes has 
been delegated to the Defense Ministry, which tends to treat Western NGOs as hos-
tile entities. The political agenda of ensuring the rights of indigenous peoples to 
land and natural resources, which has been prominent in the work of the Arctic 
Council, remains entirely foreign to Russia. Russia’s cyber and propaganda vehicles 
have scant purchase in Arctic debates, even on such geopolitically crucial matters as 
NATO accession for Finland and Sweden.
Therefore, Moscow tends to rely on traditional military instruments in building 
and upgrading a position of power, first of all in the Barents region. Gaining such 
a position, as well as proceeding with the militarization of the Northern Sea Route, 
may offer some psychological reassurance, but has failed to provide the Russian lead-
ership with any tangible political advantages. The need to score new victories, as well 
as the desire to demonstrate to the “hostile” West that Russia has no intentions of 
accepting the role of designated loser in the confrontation, may prompt the  Kremlin 
to take new pro-active steps. Here the available position of power in the Barents 
region could offer a useful opportunity for such activism. That, however, would sig-
nify a departure from the pattern of combining cooperation with the build-up of 
military capabilities, and a deliberate break with the evolving political status-quo. 
What makes such a turn to revisionism more probable is the gradual erosion of 
the attractiveness and profitability of maintaining the status-quo. Many important 
cooperative ties with Western partners, not least in oil and gas development, have 
already been disrupted. Domestic restraints and limitations on the use of military 
instruments for political purposes are in practice non-existent. Western stakehold-
ers in Arctic security must therefore be prepared for possible Russian experiments 
with projecting power. Updating deterrence mechanisms, as with the NATO Trident 
Juncture 2018 exercise, would seem a logical way to proceed. 
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